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OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN M. JOHNS,

l
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i
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i
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et al.,

it
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i

Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The petitioner below has now sought review of an order
of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
Honorable David S. Young, Judge, dismissing his Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Hereafter the appellant shall be referred
to as the "prisoner" and the respondent shall be referred to as
the "warden."
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2a-2(f) (1987) to hear this appeal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The prisoner has presented only one issue in his
docketing statement, namely whether the Court below erred in
holding that the prisoner could have and should have raised the
issue of a speedy revocation hearing in prior proceedings and
therefore was now precluded from doing so.
prisoner lists two additional issues:

In his brief, the

(1) error in the use of

allegedly false factual information; and (2) error by the Appeals
Court in denying his motion for provision of a transcript, and he
alludes to various other issues in the rather disjointed text of
the brief.

Only the first issue is properly before the Court and

will be extensively discussed here, but it is dispositive of the
other issues.

This issue is fundamentally that of whether the

prisoner, having previously litigated the legality of his
confinement, and having had the opportunity to raise the issue of
a lack of a speedy revocation hearing (and other issues) but
having failed to do so, can do so in a subsequent action.

The

warden, as respondent for the State in this matter, takes the
position that the prisoner is barred from pursuing these claims
by the doctrine of res judicata.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This matter does not turn on the interpretation of
particular statutory provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This habeas corpus action is part of a succession of
actions brought by the prisoner testing his confinement at the
Utah State Prison.

This particular petition was filed in October

of 1986 in the Third District Court and was dismissed by the
Honorable David S. Young on June 22, 1987.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The prisoner was paroled from the Utah State Prison on
June 8f 1982, after serving approximately three and one-half
years of an indeterminate sentence for aggravated sexual assault
and aggravated kidnapping.

About six weeks later he was arrested

by Adult Probation and Parole agents and charged with aggravated
sexual assault, two counts of sodomy, and possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

At a criminal trial in

October of 1982, the prisoner was acquitted on the weapons charge
but the jury could not reach a verdict on the other charges.

In

November, he was retried on the three remaining charges and
acquitted.

In December 1982, Adult Probation and Parole charged

Johns with violating the conditions of his parole, based upon
allegations of the conduct for which he had been tried and
acquitted in October and November.

A formal revocation hearing

was held before the Board of Pardons on February 5, 1983. The
prisoner was represented by counsel and was permitted to present
evidence and call witnesses on his own behalf.

At the conclusion

of the hearing, the Board of Pardons found that Johns had
violated the conditions of his parole by having committed the
offenses of aggravated sexual assault, sodomy, and possession of
alcohol, and he was retained in custody.
Two years later, in February of 1985, the prisoner
sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging numerous errors and the
denial of several constitutional rights. A hearing was conducted
on April 5, 1985, before the District Court for the Third
Judicial District, Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge. The
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parties separately briefed the issue of whether an acquittal in a
criminal prosecution precludes a subsequent parole revocation
proceeding based upon the same offenses.
rejected all of Johns' claims.

The trial court

This matter was then appealed to

the Utah Supreme Court which on April 21, 1986, affirmed the
trial court in all respects. Johns v. Shulsenf 717 P.2d 1336
(Utah 1986).
After losing the appeal in the Supreme Court the
prisoner filed a federal writ of habeas corpus, but that petition
was dismissed by the Magistrate on August 29, 1986, and no
objections were filed to the Magistrate's Report and
Recommendation.
In October of 1986, the prisoner then filed this
successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third
District Court.

This petition was twice amended and eventually

dismissed, after briefing and argument, by the Honorable David S.
Young, on June 22, 1987. The present appeal arises from this
dismissal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's position is simply that matters which could
have been and should have been asserted in prior habeas corpus
proceedings are not cognizable in a subsequent proceeding.

This

is supported by the fundamental notions of res judicata as well
as by the basic principle of judicial economy in the avoidance of
piecemeal litigation of habeas corpus claims.
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ARGUMENT
The prisoner's fundamental argument in this action
seems to be that he was deprived of constitutional rights in the
denial of a "speedy" revocation hearing after his July, 1982,
arrest and after his acquittal on certain felony charges in
October and November, 1982. (The revocation hearing was held in
February of 1983.)

He argues that the District Court erred in

ruling that he could have and should have raised the issue in
prior litigation and therefore is barred from doing so.
In his brief, the prisoner asserts among other things,
that he did in fact raise this issue previously.

If it is in

fact true that he has repeatedly raised the issue in the past,
then it is even more clear that he cannot relitigate the issue in
this proceeding, and the following argument applies even more
strongly to his case.
However, the State's argument will follow on the theory
that this (speedy revocation hearing) is an issue which could
have and should have been raised in prior proceedings, because
that appears to have been the understanding of the District
Court.
POINT I
THE PRISONER HAS NO RIGHT TO PRESENT NEW
HABEAS CORPUS CLAIMS IN A SUBSEQUENT ACTION
WHEN THOSE CLAIMS COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN RAISED IN THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING.
It is well established in habeas corpus litigation that
petitions which contain grounds for relief which could have been
and should have been asserted in a prior petition are not
cognizable in a subsequent proceeding.
-5-

The prisoner is simply

precluded, after ample opportunity, from repeatedly seeking state
remedies on state procedural grounds. Craig v. Sheriff, Washoe
County, 557 P.2d 710 (Nev. 1976).

Strict enforcement of this

principle is important to promote judicial economy and further
the salutary purpose of eliminating piecemeal litigation of
habeas corpus claims.

Diomiack v. Warden, Nevada State Prison,

630 P.2d 751 (Nev. 1981) and Karr v. Page, 437 P.2d 458 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1968).
The prisoner alludes to two Utah cases which suggest
that such procedural default rules may be waived in "unusual
circumstances" but he does not attempt to spell out in any way
how his situation may fit within the narrow confines of these
exceptions. Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983), and Emig
v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1985).

In Andrews, a death

penalty case, petitioner was allowed to go forward because the
legal basis for certain claims, which had been raised at least
indirectly in a prior application, had not been originally
available but arguably through a change in law, now was
available.

In Emig, the Supreme Court merely recognized the

petitioner's ability to file an original habeas corpus petition
to review his pre-warrant detention in an extradition proceeding.
There was no issue of successive petitions involved.
The state does not contend here that, where there is no
direct judicial appeal available from an administrative*
proceeding, such as a Board of Pardons hearing, the aggrieved
person (prisoner) is totally precluded from filing a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.

Rather, such a petition, if filed, must
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include all of the claims which are legally available to the
petitioner at that time.

In the present case, the prisoner had a

full and fair opportunity to present all of his claims to the
district court on his first application for a writ, and yet for
whatever reason, did not do so. By his failure, prisoner has
waived his right to litigate any further habeas corpus claims in
this proceeding, and this action was properly dismissed by Judge
Young.
POINT II
THE PRISONER'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BT THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to
protect litigants from the burden of having to relitigate issues
with the same party and thus to promote judicial economy by
preventing needless litigation.

Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,

Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-329
(1971).
One branch of the doctrine of res judicata, claim
preclusion, bars the relitigation of claims that previously have
been fully litigated between the same parties.

Church v. Meadow

Springs Ranch Corp.# 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983);

International

Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979); Krofcheck v.
Downey State Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1974).

To invoke this

branch of res judicata, both actions must involve the same
parties or their privies and the same claim or cause of action.
Furthermore, the first claim must have been litigated on the
merits and must have resulted in a final judgment.
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Copper State

Thrift and Loan v, Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987);
Penrod, supra, at 874-75.
The Court should refer to the reported decision in the
previous case involving this prisoner and the then-warden of the
Utah State Prison, Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1986).
In that case the prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus on facts
arising out of the same course of incarceration and the same
proceedings as in the present action.

All of the issues raised

here either were raised then or could have been raised in that
action.

If they could have been raised and were not, they should

have been.
The combination of this

prior-cited case with the

present petition and appeal brings this matter within the
requirements to invoke claim preclusion under the doctrine of res
judicata.

The prior petition and the present action were both

brought by the prisoner, Steven M. Johns, and both named the
warden of the State Prison as respondent.

Both petitions are

based on the same claims and causes of action.

There was

judgment on the merits in the previous action and the petition
for a writ was denied; on appeal, judgment of the trial court was
affirmed.
Under the claim preclusion branch of the res judicata
doctrine, since the parties have had an opportunity to present
their case, the prior judgment is binding both as to those issues
actually tried and those which could and should have been raised
in the prior proceeding.

Copper State Thrift, supra, at 389;

Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379, 380 (Utah, 1974).
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Where

res judicata is applicable, the prior judgment is conclusive upon
the parties and is a bar to subsequent litigation of the same
issues.

Penrod, supraf at 875;

Olsen v. Bd. of Ed. of Granite

School District, 571 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1977). This is true
even with respect to additional items raised as factual matters
by the prisoner in his brief on appeal because these issues could
have and should have been raised in the previous proceeding and
the prisoner has shown no type of unusual circumstance which
would have precluded him from doing so.

Otherwise the concept of

res judicata becomes meaningless and the courts are subjected to
endless litigation rehashing old issues with merely new arguments
being asserted.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons enunciated in the foregoing the
warden respectfully requests that the Court affirm the dismissal
of the petition.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ C T K

day of February,

1989.

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
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